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Final Flea SCrlSLLEiBSRG

Year HonorsJ

Tile doffeiisfci ha§

rized in

in its final brief

•feiio result cf tiio coso in cbief in tJie case against the
Gefeacc^ntf alter SGKiULLl^ FFKG-, In a further brief a reply
•vv<^s iiiade to the allegations cf the prosecutien. The defense

at this x-^'-int eiiphatically agoin colls the attention of

th^^ iriouiiol to-the fact that it was unfcrtaately necessary
tw dv.c:i in these oriofs also with the Cxuostionable nelfe'tods
eju^.loyed oy the x^rcsccution*s in presenting its evidence,

Tne defense was fcreed to refute false cLaotr^tions of
d^cunentsby the x-i'asocLiticn and an interpret-:cbion which
>-ftjn wcis absurd, Jr one cfn draw conclusions from the

i.xeuhcds employed td present a oe se cs to tho strength Of
the case then the prosocuticn^s c.-.se against the defendant
Xluer SGr-ULLj.ii._G- must
r^ ther wealc,.-nd this is the case. Under Count I of the indictment

'^Iter

.G is accused of pr.rticipation in the

^.lanning end waging :f eg -ressive wars and under Count'
II of pa .tioipation in c. conspiracy to this end. The de
fense-is in the fcrtiuicte ^-osition of being able to dis.'..•ense with s discussion cf the .basic prcblemxS under in-' '
bernctional and crimcnal lav on the subject cf 'Aggressive
r." It is profiting in this respect by the statements
end expert opinions su..:mitted in this connection by other
dufense counsels. But it is decisive that even, a brief

glance at the stage effects cf this play which has been
s-.- gl-ringly UlaLr^nnted ay the rrcsocutien rovoals that
the defendant oCIbiibnb.LBIG cannot even be foyrfL among the
dram tis personnel. It has been made sufficiently clear
oy n^w in several trials cefcre the Huorxiborg Uilitory,
Tribunals th t the group cf persons who might '-'ctually
belong
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X'Xoc SC:nii»IjI;Ei'^^EiRG'

(pegG 2 cf cri'::-J3.nal)
\

i. • ..
tv the perpetrators of the planning - c.nri
cciispiracy cricks
is very limited^ It cciaprises exclusively the tci^ smu. cf

tho odninistraticn, enr the derjorKoticn lino hetvjeen

these vjho are reapcnsihle and these who are free of any
rosx:cnsibility acccrding to the pertinent previsions of

the Contrcl Council U.-w separates tho group of the spiritUo'l authors and loaders and the ,group cf tiiose iuen "whose
j>r rticipa tion s
-less iiipcrtmce", as v-as held by the
judgment in Cose VI, '

In ...rder to ascertain ^vhetier the dofendant oChELLEIPEERGw.s even near this dGncrhoticn line wo wish to consider

once more briefly the evidence introduced by tho prose
cution in connGction with Counts I and II of the incictment.^ They are ccntc incd in Document Docic 71, Ic begin
V'dth we find there

Document L 16'5 h'xhibit 1140 and
Doc ument L 219
"
II4I:

i

...>

lables cf Crgenizati*-.n >_f the •''•SHi (jrioich occurity JilRln

Office) cf 1 Jana~ry 1941 and 1 October 1>43, They do not
reveal anything with regard to SCHDLLEDt-lihC-r^ s position
at the time of the Vonlo-incident which occurred on 9
November 1939. ...cccrding tc the Table of, Organization
D 1<^5 SCxIErLLD. „LiilDG ",as on 1 JanUf-ry 1941* th'.it is more
then-a year 1 tor, 33-Sturmbannfuehror and hogierungsrat
and in charge of Group IV D - counter-intoliigence - of
the DSrh.^ j.t that tlAo he w^'S 31 years eld, at the time
of the Venlc-inoidont 29. Since SCnSLLrnDDIiG is neither

loxander the Groat nor l^ti^clecn tc whom tlie prosecution'
in its final brief ociipares him, in cthor words since he
weis not vnidin.p tin- ship cf state,

must dr.w the

necessary ocnolusicn from his youth and lev; rl;ink that he
simply did net bclon,; tc thi.t -rcUj-.- In tho'administration
which decided about w r :r posce. He actually was e little

tchl carrying cut orders which he received; and by oerrying
cut these orders Ji^ did n: t unleaoh u war, n. r even one
phase cf a war which -w: s decided end m god e.t quite e
different level by quite different people.
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Final Flea SCHSLLEK'BEHG
»

{page 3 cf criminal)
The SS-StUTiaibonnTu-^iypeS* (helding the conparative rank of

a captain) did n."t act differently fron an army captain
"vvhc led his company in the attack cnce he had received
an crder tc th^t effect; Like such en army captain SCK&L-

IFiFBLHG- neither planned on c.g^ressive

r nar cic he be

long tr the group cf persons conspiring against peace,
\

:^a:h.llL2 and the cover letter

nn official report on the Venlc- incident by the

Letherlands ,:ovornment Vvhich as evidence is without yolue
The report re-iteratos the position ,wMoh the ^Netherlands
government had to adopt officially ccnccming the Venlc-

incident. There is no proof for its ccrr v.ctnoss, ^hat
:fes however decisive is the f^:ct that this report does not

disclose any circmistanoes which would classify the de-^
fend^nt SCEHiLLi-i'LBHG as one cf the ''cliiof porpetratcrs",

as one of the leaders cf the Reich, a position whicgt he
simply did not hold,
/

Looument ;HG 469I, Ly_h,1144:

Lxcerpts fr^m the •'Cberheitmann material". They repre
sent press inforartions with which the dofondcnt SCilKLLEI^N^

BJiLG had no connectio-n. Their contents in nc way mentions
a criminal position which the defendant &C:-:ji.LLLI'-BLLG might

have held as one cf the perpetrators involved in the

prepnraticn of an ~ggressivG war and the ccnspiraoy.
Lccuiaent 7S9

' '

exhibit 1145j

i- speech by EiO?im;... cf 23 November 1939 ••hich

has no

value OS evidenoo in the case •ago inst SCIieLIPiiiimRG either.

For-the Criae against bCBLLLLihEriG allegos th^t he was one
of those who plcnjiod aggressive wars 'ud vjho took such a
decisive p^ rt in tiig planning that their's was the decision
botwer.n war or peace. It is this cocuiiont which shows the

diffarenco betvraon the ctual planner and the subordinate
agonoios who wore not asked at all,
''

-

3 -

i..j -X.f.yi:

• .

i

V'""

Final Plea SCiiELLE)l J--ji.KGr

(page 4 cf criginol)

:Svcn the Ccxanianders-in-Chief cf the i.^med Fcrces to •whom

speech -was xjade were only iafcrmed abcf^t .alTLEIl^s trend
of thought cn^d the decisions taicon by him, r.nd not even
Field ilarshols cr Goncrnls were consulted about their

opinion cr hod influence upon these dooisions; and yet

this chorge is made against on entirely subordinate
person'--;

Pcouiient hG 4672 JiSJi II46 '-nd
Memorandum cf the German pcvernment to the Netherlands

and nelgian governments v/ith the attached FnlCM/HB-lvxLEJt
report containing the assertions about the connoctions
betv^ecn the Secret Service agents in ndland and bolgiom
and the official butch and Nx.lgion authorities. These

documents neither maho SC/NELMbi'^EG a member cf the small

group cf actual planuers of an aggressive war since ho
was under orders to cc-cperate in cbtainin; the r.ja.terial,
locument 2316 Hixhibit 1147i

memorandum by the Foreign Office ccncGrning' the co-

cperaticn with x^mt VI-_Foreign Intelligence Service - which
is dated 9 x^ugust 1940? that is the time when the defen
dant SOBFLLFrBFEG neither was in chcrge no-r oven a i.iember

of .mot "VI. Chief of -.-tit VI v/as SS-Brig-;def uohror ICbT.

\

SC.;-FLII yXEEG at that tiiuo however -"Aas Group Loader IV E *•

Gc Uiiter-Intellit^'encG- he h d no influence cither upon the

troiicvs of thcugnt of the Foreign Cfficc no-r cf those cf
the Chi'.->f cf office

rt was explained in the Final

dricf of ^he defenso (LngitP.33) and it was alsc

(..ffi-

dcvit IMLlJi.g MN, lefonso b:c,a'ic. I, p.43 th. t the central
office for intelligoa.oo ^.^:rlc in hclicnd and eonso/tiaently
also for the intelli-aoiice operations with the intelligence
officers cf the Secrc^t Service was i mt VX, Ncboay hoard
th *t Chief cf Office K ST whc was one cf the defendants
here in X'uernborg before
-

4 "•
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Final Plea SCESLLiiJlv^rjDHGr

(page 5

original)

e Hilitary Tribunal ever v^cs ciiarged with preparation
I of c?n agjressive war* To doubt, he could net bo found

guilty cf such a chtorgo either, ±^11 the less it i&
possible to find'"the dGfendant bCHhLI*EIv'..EhG guilty of
such a charge since he yk s ordered to participate in
these intelligence cparotions only as po>rt of his

tro.ining to prove his v/o-rth in the oounter-intelligenoe
service.

Kow a word about the witnesses nustered ^oy the pro
secution in connection with the Venlo-iacident. There

is first the witness d-bS t.: whose affidavit Doouaent

3945J^xhibit 254 the prcsecuticn is referring. Herr
Gu-US, in the Foreign office, is^ shewn receiving, from

SC-ElLFrhERG perscnclly o ccmx:ll^.tion of reports oonW/-,

oorning the collaboration of the oooret bervioc vjith

tho E-.lgian and iUtoh authorities,

knew tint Herr

Ct XJb . s RIBBFNriRCi?*s clcsost advisor was consultGd

all tho tiioe on the fcrnulaticn cf every statement by
.-.XBHE/fnci, Here we come very much closer , to the
.group -af people who were preparing and planning since

...IBPH/Pif 1 certainly %v-s ono cf them. But is Herr a.US

in the dock? He , he is a prcsecuticn witness to testify
Ibout th.. alleged actloais cf others while a cloud of
oenevclont f crgetfulSiess descends upon his memory as

f-r OS his r.mi tctivity in decisive aoaeata and in
roo,lly decisive iositlcns is ccncernedl But let us
i3icr.; thesa fcots which interest ether defendonts '

in these ircoeodings nucii more. Horr G,.0S neither was
gale, tc tell anythin,;: that could brand the dofond.nt

SC^jiLLs;;. Mia ta a nan i^lanain.. • war and cons oirln.:^. The
------S22.HU:rii_2^^L±r_L£n£5^SU!§_™si'Q only in 0
^.eSitlon tc describe actual events cf the Venlc-inoidont«

«
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linage ^
criginsl)
\G nonticn only oasuc^lljr tlio fact that the prosecution
did net cell as v/itnossos thp ciiiof xjarticiponts i^'jor
S'j}ZjY,i~S end Captain 3FST, "but Captain BEST'S c.uoafieur

who ivturally did net end could not have a true insight
into thu real faots.ci* the cose. It suffic.^s to stv^e
that ncne cf tha abcve-nenticned -witnesses was able or

did testify onyhhing -^-^hr tscover with regard to the actusl
charge in question, i.e. th-.t SCili-LIFiriBEKG bGlcngod to

tho group cf tncse persons who ,^-,lanned war' and conspired
to this end. Lhvicusly the only purpose of their

ap.pGcranoe lay in supporting the prosecution's propa

ganda canpai.on against tlis defendant. Ihfi:® the entirely
superfluous "identificotion scene" LEIvl/iEi\^/SCEEi£P:L before the tribunol, reported in a sensational nanner by
the entire v/crld press, was nothing but an act serving
toward this end: it vas suporflucus since no one had

CLUOstioned that tte defendont SCiiELLEi^EhG had .^.orticipotod in the negotiations with the British intelligence
officers and that he tcolo p rt in the Yenlc-incident.

The stBteaents about tho injury t^nd subsequent death of
the Lutch Lieutenant aLCP vjho posing as a -ritish

cfiioer, had v,urticipotGd in the negctinticns served the
sane purpose. Here the .r o.secuticn even roalc..s tho absurd
'allQgati:n th"t in Venlc BO^-iSLLEiiBEK "shot Lt. . LC'I in
cold blcod". The prcseoution does net charge hin with

this o'rii-is knowing that he did net ocini.dt it. Yet it "is

certainly a T^ery effective mse to iraply sons such action
as be in.- attributable to tnj defendant,

te;?<
.i
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FinOvi Piaa S'chellSnberg'

only shot into the Csir anc". that Klop vras not •'-mounded

until he himself

had shot several times# Luckily, the atteirpt at least to cast suspicion

on Sohcllcnborf "incidentally" as a murderer, if not to indict him
directly as such, could be thwarted by the testimony of the witness

vrmock (Trans«, par-e. 6882), v;ho ^"-'as 'able to five the name of tho man
who in returninf tho shots fired by Lt. Klop unfortunately wounded
the latter^

ivjoroovor, the defense has also proved that Schellonberf's task was moroly
^(4-

conducting the nopotiations v/ith the British intellimcnoe officers,
but that he t"os not in charpc of the arrest detail, Innodiatcly after
tho incident, he ^'rovo back to Duosseldorf alone in his car

assuninf thf;t tho hea". of the detail and the Chief of Police, Dr.
Hassclbachcr, in Ducsscldorf, vdio was rosponsible for all further

measures v/ith rospect to those persons arrested, would also see that
the wound'.:d Lieutenant Klpp would receive the necessary morlioal care.
Finallj', tho prosecution also subnitted
Document 3710 PS. Lxhibit 1148

as ovi''Gnco of Schollonborg's participation in plannin-- an affrossivc
ar arainst Soviet

wt-

.ussiA« ihis is an affidavit of the defendant
in

himself, in which t ;c latter states that ho was includo^ncfotiations
between Hcydrioh and General 'v'jafrer, tho Goneralquartiermoistcr of
iu-my, fo^ formulating an ag-rconont. The purpose of this agrGoment was

to draw the linos of authority bctv/oon the /chrmacht and the "Binsatz-

gruppen" to be assirnod in the Eastern campaign. This, howovcr, havd

nothing to do mth the separate order socrctly issued to those Dinsatz-

gruppon to kill Jews, of ^vhioh the dcfcndr.nG knev/ nothing, but referred
•:d the task of the Binsatzgruppcn to polioo the occupied territory. I'b
true that bcforf:. ho v/as included in these nogotiations, thj defendant
"•as informed that war with Soviet iLussia was imminent, 3owcvcr, in

this case too, neither by this information nor by his boine ordered
to take part in che nogotiations mentiono'^, did he booomc a mombor
of the circlo of th- highost political leadorSiiip, vj]iioh
-
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Final Plea Schcllinbcrr

can be held crininall-- rcsponsiblfor planninr and ccncluctinf an
a^prcssivc war afainst the Soviet Union or for conspiracy to this end

as defined by Control Council Lav; Ko. 11. Nono of the Einsatzfruppcn

leaders v;ho at this time v/erc actually busy with the organization and
training-, etc. of thoir {groups, was indiicitod or sentenced for a crime
the peace, not oven the chief defendant of the Einsctzpruppcn

trial, Jhlondorf. Indeed, th®y are not guilty of this crime. 3ut hovi much
loss so is Sohcllcnbcrr, v;ho never had anythin£- to

do with the activities of

thosG Sinsatzgruppon and who was only called upon to formulate an agroo-

ncnt with

the vVohrmacht regarding thoir police authority^ He neither

organized the- Sinsatzgruppcn, nor did ho activate thorn, and even Field

Marshals and Generals who commandod. entire armies to bo deployed in
the Sast ware not punished for preparing ('.n aggrossivo war against the
Soviet Union, for even thoy did not belong to that small circle of men,

of whom - if not altogether of only one man - it may bo said they
really responsibly plaiincd and prcp''.rcd this war.

The defense will dispense vdth discussing in ""Gtail the evidonco
which it submitted relative to counts I and II of the indictront and

the results of the oxaninations of its witnosses pertinent to-fchis.
The entire material has bocn Gvaluatod in th-:

Trial 3riof of the

prosecution and in the rebuttal to the Trial Brief of the prosecution,
and

-

8

-

Pinc.1 Flcr. Schcllanberr

it woulc"'. only irr'posc upon tho court's •nP-'tiGnoc to hc.TO the stnteirontD whioh.

it has read in both documents of the defense onoo moro presented hore»
The Icptl aspects of the case, as ^vcll, ere too cloar to require

further clurifioation. In section D I - pa^io 140 - 153 of its Trial

brief, the defense desoribod this lojral situation in connection vdth tho
provisions of Control Council Law No. 10, which is tho basis for the

Nuernberg Trials, and with the findings of the Nuernberg Tribunals.
This description as well as the roviev: of the ovidonce irust result
in the follov/ingj The defendant Schcllonberg was not one of the
political loaders of the Roich, either before the invasion of the
Netherlands, or before the war against Sc-iot ~ussia, ho cannot be

hold rosponsi'^lo for planning and -waging an iifgrcssivo war and entering
into a conspiracy to this end, v.c thoroforc request o.n acquittal on
Counts I and II of the Indictnent#

In count V of the indictment, '.'/alter Schellenborg is then accused
of hairing oommittod v/ar crinos and crimes ar/inst humanity by having

taken part in criminal acts against th.j civilian population* The indictmont
regards-those acts'as havin/ materialized in Sohcllonborg's inclusion

in tho formulation of the Keydrioh-./agnor a( rccm.cnt, in an allogod

particination in tho organization of Dinsatzgruppc.n in Yugoslavia and
in tho publishing of an order prohibiting the omigration of Jo-'/rs from

'^olfiun and Franco, -/le will again take up first of all the rolo of
Schcllehborg in the formulation of tho Hoydrich—'jagnor agrGom.ont, ana

hore WQ will again proceed by givin^ once more a brief survcj' of the
prosecution evidence. The most incriminating prosocution document
portnining to tho Eoydrich-.af:nor agrooment is

-

I

-
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Final Plea SohGllen"b3rff

Document 3710 Exhibit 1148

the statem.ent of the defendant himself, -which was presented to the
latter by the intorrog-ation official for signature on 26 NoTremher 1945.

V.'G cannot omit pointing out tho fact that at that time Schellcnberg

77as not -uvarned that this statomont was to be used against him. It ivas
rather the basis of testimony given by Schellenbcrg in tho H-T trial,

in •'.vELXch ho -ms used as -witness for tho prosecution. On tho contrary,
shortly lieforc tho opening of Case XX, Schollenborg was assured that
he himself v/ould not be placed under indictment at all, in fact tho
indictment first published did not oven .contain his nnane. The

procodure of using an affidavit of tho dofondCint as a i^u^Jor incriminating
docunont, can, hov/ox^er, not result in any for the prosecution. Being

fally awaro of this fact,

the prosecution in its ar^ um.ontation

attempted to clcdm "tho defendant himself states in his affidavit that..."
and then to draw conclusions which the prosecution vfould like to
attribute to him., but which schcllonb::;r,; never said in. his affidavit,

/-fhhttdld tho dcfondnnt Schollsnberg rectlly say? Tha.t ho v/as
ordorcd by the Chief of tho

Hoydrich, to continue the nego

tiations already bs^;un vri.th the Goneralquartierrreistcr of tho i^-rmy.
General Uagncr, because of his experience in matters of protocol.

This assign]nent 7/as based on

n order of Hitler to assign units of

the Security Police and the- SD, the so-called Sinsoitzr ruppon, in the
East to tho frontline troops of the ja^rmy, v.lth the duty to covor
the frontline troops a-nd if necessary to break any resistance in

the conquered territories. The airoement determined the relationship
of subordination and authority

- 10 -

Fiiir.l Plcu SchcllcnbGrg

b--"ti\cun -Jehrmaoht aiicl Einsc-tarruppen. The c^rrQemont, previously cliscusssd
and formulatod by Schollenbcrp with OGnoral .".agncr, was finally signsd
by Hoydrich and Yj'agncr. Schollenhcrp furthermore- describes in detail that no

mention was made in those negotiations in his presence of an ordor to

killJerasG and that reports about activities of the Elnsatzeruppcn in
tnis Gonnoction hixd not come to his attention until he mode the affidavit

in 1145, The version of the staut--ir>;rit sub^ittod by the dcfcnda.nt Schel-

lenberp furth'^r shovfG that it was foriMji-ited in or'^or to pin Sohcllenherr dn-^vn to as positive as possiblo a. form.ui-.ti.:r? repardinr an e.ssurption

wnich, basa-' on the con'"'.iti :ins, equally predicate--"'

imowledgo of the

.•«elirnacht leadership concorninp the oxocutions carried, -ou^ by the
Einsatzgruppcn. To testify as to the contents of this affidavit, the
prosocution then brought SchcllonbGrg to the v^itnoss stand in the It'll

trial„ .rt.t thct tiniQ it iefendod his statement against the attacks -of the
defense in all points as absolutely crodiblo, thus rsgardo'": as indis-

putaolo the truth -of that which today it would liko only to bo oonsiderod true insofar as it fits its concept now, i=.s we ha.vG soon,

Sohollenbergfe participation in the draft of the agreom-snt was limited
to v/riting

provisions f-jr perfectly legitimate activities, such as

must be instituted in the roar of any fighting army, and such as wore
conplctely Indispcnsible for a campaign in Soviet bussic. with the
p-rtisan oYSTfr-.ro neth-ods peculiarly characteristic for this country.
As further evidence tho Pr~sooution introduces
Document 2890 Exhibit 2038 and

Document 2620 Exhibit 2039,

-
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c.fficlnvits of the 3inartzrrupponfuchrcr Otto OhlcnJorf, in which the

latter r-iakcs basic coFimonts on the prolir^inary history and o-ctivitics

of the Einsatz^rruppen. These stator-.onts hc.vo nothit tn do with the

'"-'-•fontiC.nt SchcllGnbor^, Ohlcndorf, 'ivho was inferred about overythinr Gonncctc.. with the Sinsatz^ruppcn and their Gctirities, docs
not mcntim SchGllcnberf;'s nare at all, which he certc inly would
not havG oritto- : oinp, if he had he.-, my basis f:)r includinp Schallcnbcrp" in the activities of the dinsatz^ruppen. The dofcnso has called
attention in its closinr brief to the rarkod liffcrcncos between Schollcn-

berp and Ohlondorf (Enfo p. ^6). 3ut this very doscriptim of Ohlendorf
is proof for the truth of Schellonbor^'s statcvacnt that ho knew nothinr?

of the special -'uties of the Einso.tzpruppon. For Ohlend.nrf above all

shows the clear separation of the official security assirnnicnt which
was the basis ?f the HGydrich--.aanGr arrocTicnt, and the special order

of the Fuehrer, which y/as issuc'^ to the Einsatzaruppcnfuehrsrs orally
they

an' in strict secrecy, bcforc/v;cre aotivctod. In a petition of Ohlen
dorf s defense v/hich vjas recently subritte.- tGeneral Clay, this
stutowcnt y/r.s nadc on this point;

"The assi£nin£ of special units of the Security Police to the
Eastern area of operations of the Gerran Aj:ny, was based on en

order of liitlor several months bof oro the bo{inninf of the E-'stern

Ca-ip.ai,;n. It v/as rcpulatcd in 'ctail by an agreement between "tiie
OKII and the Chief of the Secuxity Police and the SD."

In this decree it v/as provide

that the armies shoul'"" bo assi-no'"" '•

liaison officer "-f the Security Police and the SD, to

mobile units

of the Security i'plice c.n' the SD, e.g. Sinsatzpruppcn or Einsutzkommrina^is
respectively, were subor•'inat©•

-
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These foriTC.tioriS were iieithGr offices nor oth&rmso included in the

TO if the .tSiUij rather, they wore s-pooial rr.ohilo units which had be-ori .uoaniai..
orfunizcd ae hoc for a certain specified assirmrent.

The mer-bcrs of the 3insctzpruppon and Sinsatzkommandos were either
taken from the re^nlcs of the Security Police and the SD, or they v/ero

drafted, c,f,, as truck drivers or interpreters, while the prcrt
mctjirity of recruits Viicrc assigned to their tasks loy order of Eimm.ler

an'^ orfanizo'^ into companies of th- constabulary and the ac.ffan-SS» ^
Tho Einsatzfruppcn an'-' SinsrtzkoiriTnan'VjS, thus, wcr- not offices, "nd
n>^t ruth critics, hut -ilitary units.

It ./PS thoir '""uty to provido political security in the occupied
territories, both in th^. ..chmT.,cht sphere of operations anl in the
rear Gohclon tcrrit'Orics v/hich were not liroctlj'' un'.er civilian

administration" (oft Opening" Statonent of the prosecution in Ci.so EC
of 2d Sept. I94:7j Gorman pa^c 11), In dotoil, this include'', first and
f orcFiost: investigation of undGr("ri.iun'l .m"' p;rtisrr_ movoncnts, of

ospionago, sabotoge etc., reporting to a VJr5'- extensive degree m the

political situation to the c^mpoient commanders of the ariiy, oaro of

ethnic groups ( .thnic Gcrmin Tartars, Ukrainians, ctx,), special
assifnnents of the armies, which could consist in bringing in the
harTTost, ruardina bridges, the use of whole detail at the front,
ifighting partisans, etc.

vVithin the security duties, in a spocial order of Hitler

-
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Finr.l PI-: r. 3ch:>ll-n"'cr^

v/hioh v.xs not cotrnunioat
Eins^.tzVon^-irndos until

to th. Icc.dcrs of th. -ir.SF.tz^-rupocn rnd
c. f.v;' -^.z-.y-s ocforo th

^-^Cfinninr of the Sr.stcrn

cemo'itn; this order decreed thc.t in rddition to th^- fcnorq-1 duties
of th'. ScGvtrity Polio:, r.nd the SD, tho Sinsr.tz-fornations h&d '^ton
rivon the tc.slc of scfcfufrdin

:.nd nrotcctin;

tho crof^. in the roi-.r of

•rrsM

7

thj frontline hy

®' GO.vjo.unist c..-cnts, cctiTO
-'ho mi;'ht hr.vc- onchnrc'rod the

sscuritj'-.

The i-itler order to l<ill v/ns rosponsih.l: for events which he^vo

boon der.lt vdth c.s Sins :.tz( rupp n .Tricl .bofore th: i%F©--ic?.n '--ilite-ry
Tribuno.l Fo. II in Kuornborf ." (ihiitcd St?.tcs of o.irc.riO': v:rsus Otto

Ohlcnderf ct r,l "CoTrrri.cnt on Pr.ots an'-" Loyal Questions r.risiny duriny

tho Sins:.tzcrupp;.n Trial (Cr.sc

hcfo>-o th-. ^^rrc- icrn idlitary

Tribun-l II in Kuernborf" by ' u.^.olf Aschonauor, Dcf^-ns. Counsel,
Paf-'. s 2 r nd 3) . In that trial

defense couns:;! for the defendant

Ohl'-n-^orf hrs onu^errtod trVo fundarr^ntr l

difforonocs ivith utinost

luoi'"ity, nerelyj Ih- differonco bstweon th. yenoral Hitlor Decree
'I' •<

^'rderin^- tho formation of Sinsr-.tzyrupp^-n "nd draftinr the table of

•oryGnisr.tion for th: pcncrfl tasks-of th-. Scoxurity Police, as defined
in tho jurisdiction bror.k-do'-n of th. . ohrFacht v;ith the abovcorri..nisetion and fixo- in the

.a rer-L:ydrioh earccrr.ent} on tho other

han'..., th_ra o.t.s hitler's spwcial. "ocrcc specifying a.dditionel tasks, i.o.
the killin

Jews, Gypsi.s, co:">pu:iist r./cnts, c nz"" active ConF'unists • If.,

to orovm those c.rumonts , Qhl n? ^rf himself Gnnnciutcsi "'Ihis Kitlc-r^

dccr:;^ to kill wts r.sponsiblc for th svorts which ..... formed th©

subject of thcj Sinsatzrrupp(-,n Trial", this prpiiounoem-^nt ostcblishos
th"' feet that those evonts vrer'Q not pctuall''f linked to- th'- discussions
concornin.:- the limits which wer. fixed for tho jurisdiction of the

.loh-mecht an"" thj Tinsv.tzrrupnen, -r-spc otiv-: ly, as th^.y merely oovored
lof itinrtc rener'l duties, lioreo'^'cr, it is quite ir-possiblo

-
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Finr.l Pit:. Scholl .n'-erf

to tr^.ce; :.ny crii-ninally cf.usc.l oonnoction bGir.vcan the fact of in-

clu'J-inf Schcllonbcr; in the irr.ftinj; of tha

ncr/iiiydrich aircon'.nt

•:-nd i.ny other tjoc of activity cr.rrisd on by the liiinsctzprupnc-nB
hr.s been r^-ntionc^ b:foro, leitlor -rros r: sponsible for th". decree

to orf anise the Hiinsetz^ruppen, r-n' it was hi-r-lir who irr-plc rented
it conjointly --itb th. Chief of th Security Police, hoydriah.
Lt no tine '"'i' Scholl:nborf con'no.n"'' en Sinsatz; rup'pe , nor

s he in

chF.rfo of such a fo"vrtion or <" nenbcr there, P-is inclusion in the

t "lbs concernin'- ^n aprernent that cover-d th.- " nsatzf rupp^.n vdthout
his boin-' responsible fci- such matters rs part of his vdepTtnent:.!
duties, can ncrely bo ascribed to ochellonbc-rf ' s w-:. ll-knoi'ci skill in

•drc-ftinr, .e fact \7hich rcsultef in his

enoiiitnent of presiding durinp

those nor oti-itions, Schollv.nb. r" cannot be h.l"'' responsible for ^ny
action of any of th' -insetz. rupwn; he is just as innocont as the

Lai-yi.r, who oonpuunas an ejreeraent to be ce.r.ied out by third parties,
vdth rv.(-r.ra to actions vrhich,at a future date, th^ contraotinp

parties errbark upon, although such cctions

ro not expressly

stipulate'"' or even erbodioa"', in thj arrecn-nt,

In this conn ction, we v/oul' lik.. to refer one-: irore to tho
statencnts of the defonso contained in its final brief concorninf the
fundarronti 1 rules obsorvo' in :11 rc'ul'^r trial.s, Acco'"'"inr to those
rules, it is imperative to nr o^ " that th
. F.n rot vdiich

d-efendant has committed

I'T'S orusal for th.^ criidnal result ther'of, as this

constitutes th; condition th?" t -.tquI'" support cn' substrntir tctb/v fin/dn-

of th-^ '"•.-"f endr nt's

uilt criminal,

j. vrcnt to ruiterrtc

tho P'ords '"ith '"hich i«.ilitery Trf'-un" 1 No, V, in Case 7, rccofnised

the vr lidit" -u such I'unl'^^nt.d rules, as •applicable to th
:mornb-,rr T^* .-.alsJ

"in

et n'.nil in( the ruilt er j.nnocenoc of th.se '^efand-nts

v/o shall require proof of a. causative overt act

-
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Fin'l Pic.7 SGhcllonborf:

or omission from which c. ruilty intent cc.n be inferred

before r, verdict of guilty will be pronounced. Unless
this DC true, c. cfimc could not be srid to hr.-^c been

conwiittcc unlawfully, willfull-"and knowlingly as
chc.rfori in the indictmC'nt,

Ihw question to bo resolved here is not the prdnouncinf of fcncrcil

assunptibns and sunioions, but o^oof -.-rill have' to bo brought to the
effect that certain acts were corrdttcd by a certain defendant, thf^t
by committing thora Irws ivcro tiolatod vrith criminal intent, i.e.
both d.oliborately and intentionally, th^t the defendant knew about the
criminal result o:, his action anr", finally, the.t the int-endc^' effect
actu'.lly cr.terialiscd.

.-c discern immediately that there is no proof whatsoever as
to Schcll.en^-crr *s activities in conjunction with th_ neV otiations
that Gulmir.atod in thv heydrich/w-:,,-acr a;Teom:.-nt, ana th..t Schollcnborr neither had the intention to commit, nor cxoCctcd the realisation,
of a criminal act, we arc suro that the defendant's own statement

docs not constitute such ovidonoc. Is there any other proof which

the prosecution nidht have adduced? In ad'^ition, the prosecution

•"

Document 4509 Exh. 2040

..-r

has introduced the affidavit of Eerr ^rd ow,/io'rt from siw-cpinp
fcncralisr.tions which '11 subor-'int.tcs usualljr a'^fcnoe about their

superiors, this rffidavit altagcth-.r oontcins only tvro assertions
. »a<

/

an,

that h-'-vc "ny ber.rin: at '•11 on th: .subject, as referred to by the
pros'-cution, One of tham. states tlicit the reports of the Sinsats-

fTupp-..n w.-r. "chann.ellcd to all the nmts Chiefs bLcauso all dot/.ils

in the situation reports of the .Sinsatz^ru.rp. n were of interest to
tho various ^jpts of th. -JSFwd." .a lo.w/ -nyvaay that those reports

hj d i distribution key which montionod all th. ijr?ts Chiefs; this can
bp soon from th

reports, submittod by the prosecution.
Exhibit 2042 and 2058
of document ho..»k 71
-
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Besides, it is (juitc o^cn to conjecture ^fhcthwr the officos mentioned
in. the clistrihution key Actur.lly iriTbrmc;' themselves ubout the

'.li

'A'

reports, r fc.ct v/hich the prosecution hos fc.ilod to prove at e-Ll.

Eorr Lindoi"/, at r.ny rat:, did not s:y anythin.' about this point. For
oxamplr, durinf cross-exr.rinr.tion ho vr.s u?irblc to state v.hy hrn.t VI
-•the "vffice dee linr v.'ith fore vpn ante llirenoc services - shuold have

been inte-rcstc--^ in anti-Jc-.=7isch vorsures in th: occupied -.ussian
/

territories, as r. jn'^tter of feet,

VI

not concern itself '-t

all v'ith tV of or-.mention'd • ussi n territory; its task v;:,s to collect
'/

intclliponoo about forii.rn countri s, i.e. such tcrritorios vhich

wore not under German .ju'^iS'^ictionl Ihis fact is also clearly shov/n
in document 2890 Exh, 2033, the
boon Fiontioned befor.,

Ohlcnborf affidc.vit, which has

Ihcrc it is statcdj

"Th: reports to Berlin W(;nt to th- Chief of the Slpo and SD
in the dc-ich kair. Security Offic

.After the Founf.in: of the

Comnando-Staff of the Chiuf or th. SIPO

SD in about Jay

1942, this (staff) prcprrad th: subsequent reports. Bio Commr.ndoSteff onsistod hasicrlly of Gruppenfuohrar illSLIE . Chief of
Office IV and Obcrsturrbannfuohrcr

NOSKE, Group Leader in

Offico IV, to whom specialists from Office III, IV and

(Pr-tc 6 of the or-i,-inal)
^•'crc p.vnilablc f or coordinating tho •coir-positi .on of the reports.
Questions vhioh had to do o-rith th- porsonnol of the £r.oup and
with ^-arrisons, oame t'o Offio'. I. ia'.ministrativc- quostiohs and

'

•'•iff,,.";

"

u

v

nu'.ttors conccrnin:

equipment were taken carc o.f ay OffiC': II«

•

'

»

Information ;.0'>ut th: Qph.rcs of lif, (SD) wont to Office III,
The Chief of Offio: IV receive'' reports on the foneral security
1

situation, includinf Jov/s and communists. Information about
'^sian areas went t ;

-rf

' iJK.V ;

-
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Final Pier Scholia
\

This dovetails with the stntcmcuts rrf- hy F-osk- , whom OhleBforf bt.C
mention-.-- s. for. lines Vf-w this nfrticulor of-ssc,ro. Host, strtcl in

his affiacrit
/

*ri

in this oonnoction (D-.f, Doc, book II p?.;s 102 ff)5 •Officss rcccivc-^ only .

thos._- pf.rts -vhich crnc rnad thin, -r^- r
———

>^.= '-4-;

o •

x i.

Cuii„Lnsc.ti:)_s .'inn out bv

the ..eich Mcin Security Offic- veri, fir st .c-it-' by Office IV
- I), nhich can clso be so-.n on the hci bin, of th. Operation: 1
Situation -reports.

Only C.S l=tc .s th.
do.t.h"

of 1.42

th. s.-ocll:; (Jomcn-

St.ff) or-rtof.

^

of Hryfrioh, it vrrs to hoAinl of ocntrc.l co^'n' post of tho
lirioh Vf.in Security Office for th Sins*tz.-rujjcn. &!«; hovovcr
.vus rot rcclisoi,

the

the Conrrnlo Strff wos ccturll.
o

limitcr^.-tto nroprrin: th" con'-^cnsrtions of th: •ror ^rts, to be

publish-'^,

the bicich l.r^n Sscurity effioc ; r.t that, they

vrer^ no longer Opc-:txonrl Situation .^oorts, ^ut "eCOTt

'^
•h'W

froR? th' oocupie--'' b;e stern Territories,"

The eiitorirl rvork'of the Offices rrs rostrictc-' in the' • '

so o-llef Cor -rn o Stcff to th. Offices nikin. c oon--.nsotion

for thsir sphere of work out of th .ss ports of th. .linsr ticruppen
reports sent to there whioh off; cthd thoir, ml to rivin- th r to

the Cor..iT.m;.6 Strfy, vhich insortel th.r into th' complete report.
a

3y th; v,:-y, this --•o-.rlr -v^cs not, -s :. rult,/^o^ of th^ Offices f.s '
such, but ratbor of th- oonpct?nt r .-urs c.nb rofr.rrtcs, i.e. for

-Office VI it Ts VI C ], th'- _roup GOTr-^.tcnt .for th: S'st.
0.^ th- Op-jT.otionr.l Siturti.>n "oports c-?nt.:ir.o' in Pr--sccution
Doc.

71 .T, Dn^i^ p, 20 101, sho:^'n to ine.
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not r sinr !•: one v:es

^iy Cor •jT'rn:t:> Strff, they

f'll

of thi-r, oublishc•? ty Office IV (IV A l)."

This olTifics coirplctoly th- so-cc.llss "Cooporrtion" on tho pr. t
officials of i^rt VI in oorniilin; those report's, j.rrt VI vr: s .-jxclusovfly
interested in thos: ore ts that dr&lt v/ith the con it ons i.,. the

occuoic-"' sections of ussir, and it reccivei only such ports, ^'hich were

iroit mth

it, rr/ even tli:n not h^-fore the nid l--^.'

h)=/cocr,

not one r'coort suhrittTd hy th;- prospcution 9ri;:inrtt-s fro. th^.t ^jrio
Incidentally'", not one of th; Nuernherr Tri.'-un-'Is ^has

I'littu.. eo^u

as e"9idence epeinst "hy of the d-:-fbn".hnts unless actu^.?.! 9r--o,i

affercd that he hrf heen inforoied, h'oreoror, v/; v^-nt "co point,..ut th-. t
or n provided the' case the -'.•'fen-atnt had :'acn n-'-orp-i.-" ...Aca

actually not the f-ct, tis t/.ouV not constitute znr ovi-^ncs

-mst

the defendcnt. These reports refer, to events strrtinp in

thfi dGfendFnt hr d not knov/hedfc .of "them vhen he vr s call. ', upon, at

the heannin: of 1941, to draft c.n cfnecmcnt v'hich h: dnothin to

with

.v,' V'^

that •part '-d •the activities of the Blns-atzrrupp-'-n "hich is -rentiono..
in those renorts, i^s to those he was rcrely irjforpe -a -ont th--

'• '•^^
1

leritlTprte duties in connection with paint^inin' the security, in the
'

c^oreTTiontionc-V "ussi^.n territory, durtherpone, •: thorou; h pcras-

tho complete reports, v/hioh w-^re. rvaf

1 of

i'"^ Cose- Fo, 9, shows

definitely that the dins: tzprup "•'••n v/cro actu'^l'Jy en/-- -

•work to a considerr'-Is extent, 'lo'woul • like to quot- ho e c *-

' _,

the ahovc-mcntion-v'. fin-1 '"^ried of Ohlerrorf s .w.cns-- coui..

"The lact has been iirprossi'd upon us her that the r^ins-tz rup,-

h-d only one -axdusive ta?k, n.r^oly to. carp/ -:'ut the Vu.hr-r cecrce.
Thpir actual futpos, to estchlfsh

v^int.'.in politic.-l

have been slVirrod ovsr, an' thus settle-.l, -s

j ".uis;". however,

the evidsr.ce has sboivn conclusively that th - •-jir.s, tz fo r-

ir

-

•A
. (• ,.ir ,

'Mv

kj

F nal Plr-sS. 5ohc 11c n-or:

v/ere primririly'entrustsJ v;ith the tr.sks z.s clescrihcd e.hove, ^hsse
t-.slcs v/ers the sc.rre both .for units oi. th- Security Polios rnf the

SD, In the occupied uostern tsrritor es too thess te.sks v/ers pri^ro.rily
connootsd ,Y/ith policiny the ?on-j .of opcrE^ti^ns o

the .oh.'-ocht, :.s

vrall C.S suhmittinc.' reports concGrnin' the p lit-cr.l situation. It

•w£s!the

first timo thr.t, in th.3 Ji)pst, snecir.l tr-.sks vers

o.f.

c£i.r-yinf out the hitler decree r.bout killinys r.s r-^rt of the e.nti•^>olshovist

activities.

The court is acqu^'intcd vAth the ' ndiri "ur.l tasks, -s th-''- can ''
be { Icrned frorr^ rlnost ?.ll pr oseo\2tion focuronts v.-hiph, .•.part frorn
raports conoerninf th£ oxscution of the rue-hr-:r decree, .also shov^
oertinent detaili'd reports covcrim

other fiel's of

'uty, -ec:.uso of the

fact that in the nr.jority of cases th;. proscrcutior intro'ucod such

•V

(

excerpts that dealt with the Fuehrer decrso, the dsfense has supplernsnted, in various instances, these docunentsV by introduoin; the

reports about other tr.sks and duties thrt had beer, left out. The Court

•

I

itself thorou{_"hly exarrin.od several nf the dofsiidarts rs VYitnosses concsrninp such ti."-sks; thi; witnesses testifi^'""' exhaustively, .rn;"' the "•

prosecution did not refute any of their testiniony. Therefore, it can
by no means inferro^^ that. Simply by hein.- transforrod to - n hinsats-

rruppe, c-v.ory one of the defenhnts v/as ncoessarij^ connected vrith
carryinr out the Fuehrer decree. In the casvO of tvro of the i3fend:nts,
•I.

the court --'uly oonsidetcd this fact an:"", acquitted thor^ on counts 1 f nd 2,
^ali^hourh they v/ore indepcn'^-Ont of:ficir.ls in charre of divisrons as
part of the above-describe': ;sneral tasks of the ibirsatakominC.ndos.

(United Sta.tes of ^.mcrica versus Otto Ohlen'borf at al "Cpm-ent's on
Pacts and Le(fl kuostions r.risiiy durin; tha "iiios: tz^ rupp-n Trial
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Pin:. 1 Pier. Sch'illcn' erf

(Cr.se 9) hsfore tht- /-r-eric'n >ilitr.ry Tri'-'unr.l II in

Nuern'^err" "by

urlolf ^schenr.usr, Ecfense Counsel, pp.12 pnc' 13).

Ihereforo, whet i^ the rerson for the fr.ct that, the oroseoution
subnitte.* rn exoerpt from the ^insatzeruppen report? Such iocuniGiits
.are not evidence iLncriminr.tinr tliL defendant Schsllorbcrp, they

ha\-e> morely-been intror ucerl in orclor to produce an appropriate
I

effect clctriri-^.ental to tho defendants

*

The -jr.osecrtion is 01 course fully c.vrarc ' of th:-' actual value of
this particular eTidcncc, Other'-M se, it woul" not resort to such

despGra;tc ruses such as tho introduction of

• .

Document 5224 3Shi.it 3454,

a compilption of rddressos an-^ tolaohone num'nsrs .of the Sin.satz-I

rrup^on in Yufoslavia Vv'hich

^7ithin the

•••^-ar.-ly

intrn'ed for official use

On on. 59/60 and 156/159 of our final ^rief vjo

I

-

hav^ demonstrateid

^ '

nre.postorousness of tha interpretation th^

prosecution vvishos to impart to this particular :''9curcnt. Thus tho
"Inmbast of the prosecutor's cross-examination of SohclJenhcrin

denouncinf th-a m.crsur?. s cprinst Jews in Sorhia d-j^o--mciS deflated, Sven
Docuriicr.t 5224 Exjiibit 3464

•introduced, 'uiin^ the examination cannot .cham 0 the fact that

SchoTlonborj; had any connection vath those events .•/hich r'ifht ba
construsd : s. criminal offense. On the contrary, th: trxt of this

• document sh.o.- s c'learly that he ha. d no jui-isdiotion in such
matters, hut that the Foreign Offic.s usod his s.:rvices in order
to locate the comnetr^nt offijirl. I,n thife connr ction,

e rofor

to the d0tail0-\-description chrtalnsd. in the two -defense briefs.
The "Sirsatzkommando" of t he sciontlfic research .sorvioe,,
'

oonsistinr of 6 m-on, w' ich went to --ihite

-
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in 1944 — Ln'".". v/hich v/:.s' of course c.ioqu:.toly error" :.s e. protection
SifCiinst the 19c.rt1sr.ns — hc.s nothifi'- v/hatsosver to '":o ^^th the T-insitg-

'komf.ndos mentions 1« Tha prosecution statements concornin-; this par
ticular Rorpmando cannot he considered seriously. To he sure, a soiontist
needed arns poro ^r.dly in tho nartis.rn-infested V/hitc

uthcnicn

forests t^iah a momhcr of the Amorican occupation forces of -vhom quite
a suhstrntirl number "rc arnG-^ vrhcn walkin-. through Gar-^-r.n^ strrets.

Since my oripinal coni-ection on the oart of Schvllard-^-rr -/fith
the Dinsotzpruppon coul" not he conjured up, th.' prosecution
i.

'

f

•

.'1

reshrted to

Doounent 3104 Exhibit .1630

in order to imply h" this dc-vicus p^ms that Scl^ellc-n'ierr had, after

all, a general knovplec.re of the so^callud ."final solution". -lO h^-vo

proved conclusively in our final brief, on n. 65 ff., that actually
this do.cUTTient proves

that oven in kry 1941 Jev/ish' CFiifration froin.

.German-controllGd territory

still boin? promote::, and that a ban

v;as put on. Jewish omirration from Prance and helrium for the sole purpos
of.not limltinr 'tho emict-tion quot- for the eich.

o

the dame time,

WG have shown that the ir'"^ications of fee imji-inant final solufion

coul^ not have had any conn-otion with the intent of killin-. the

Jo"rs, rs the letter Gxnressly states that the infiltration of J'ws
into German-controlled territory was oall..-^. undesirable..

the term

"finrl solution" woul'' have been consider-d anrlo,-ous to the cxtorm-

ination of Jov/ry,' .all efforts would have been concentrated on sub-

jueatlnt es'mfny Jews to G.rmn vcrtr as'VasiMe. olr-oo this ioourcnt,
on ono hand,

»

'

•

-

-
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does not constitute prosooution ovidcnce, it shows on the other

hand beyond any reasona^Io doubt that Schcllonborf-'s .signature on
this docunsnt,

on some other docui!nnts, was evidently affixed

by him in the absence of the hmts chief, Muollor, and of the oom-

potent g;roup

leader and in order to do him a fax^or; by no means,

howover, was Schcllenbcpf- kucller's deputy, vie refer to tho it^&ss of
evidence, which the defense has submitted, an'"" to the detailed oomncnt

thereof on pp. 42, anrl 61-55 of our final brief, as v;g11 as to p. .....
of the defense rebuttal to the. indictment, Abovo

11 howevm, we v/--nt
I

to r.^fer to the table of org-anisation of the

-.SEu, introduced by the

prosecution itswlf, end the conclusivo evi'"''vnco rv'hich can bo

QdduGcd therefrom. Furthermore, tho documc.nts orifinatin;- with j^^mt VI,
*•«
4

Q.f. the
Docum.onts 5251 and 5554 Exhibits 3491 - 3494, ,

do not prove Schelie nborp' s prrticipation, or tba'6 of any of his'
subordinates, in the anti-Jewish measures. Evidently, "tho prosecution
relies on the fact that its arfumontation woul' bcfof thv.- issue, so
'):•

:•

that a thoroui;^h examination vwuld thus be avoided, J:^nd it is a fact

that all th'oso docuine-nts arc noachih, moru than compilations of reports
v/hich tho for.;ipn intollifonoe service'had recoiv.'froa its apcnts,
I

passinv;- them on to tho copipctcnt offices only, vrbioh informed them*

solves on hand of those reports, i,e. in the majority, of oases

to the Foroi^n Office. The matters opvcred by the reports do not
indicate any indcpcnd-rnt .adtionj rather j cx'^ents arc reported that
woro b'^sod on the actix^'itics ^^f other offices. A t VI is nothir.p

but the chroniolc>', it ••^ors rot intervehc an

it docs not have

any powers whatsoever. It coul" no.t even •;ui r^nty f'or th. authenticity
of the reports v.'hioh' it rcocivf''' from its arents .ar.""", wbich'it
t

passed on. On., certainly coul' not hall some' j.ourii.alist r •sponsi^'^lc
f

c rtain cx'onts v/hich he has covered ])ccrusc of his reports theTcof,

ncr could ho be cxpocti.d t.o int:rx"eno in such events, anr this x'ery

maxim focs also for i.mt VI'and its reports,
-
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1

liiscfar as tJie derohcV\'rG SOl-JiLLU"'BERG, witliin .oiie sccpe
cf the iiitellifc'Oicce vrrk cf i^nt YI, reoeivccl inf:r:-aticn
\

Gcnoerniri'ic any eotivityi 'cf c criiiincl netur^j, vie shell
in cur olrsir-c roaccrhs shivj hcv^ he reccned t:

such

inoiC.erts,

"Xvcw if

torn.'air cttenticn tc the Lperc-ticn SExlELIIT,
\

then y^e aust repeat tne fact thet &Cj:'ELLh-'jE:;:G h:s not

fcW'V

|i:U V- •

been ohareoC with the incidents ccnnected aith this

'

cper-^ticn. In this rospoct the i^rcsccuticn h. s suhaitted Gvidence fcr foots which ere 'net even canticnod in the

indictucent. If this Is en ''cnissi;-n" en the ..crt cf the
:

ti-'csecutivCia, as cocurroc, cn its own cd^^issicn, with

W^ ' •'

respect tc the ,cnissicn in the cnarac :f hoijij. connected
v;ith a,at IV, then this cversi:,:nt results in. uneq.uivocal
/

ccnsecxuenoes with rGS.:ect tc tne ccnluct cf c crininsl
triel: in ocnsidoreti'n cf these foots th^ defuadent
o-iinct at ell be ocnvi.oted. It is e fandc.--.ynt.: 1 iiexiii of
tho echaiStrcticn ci criaincl lew that the iadictcant

nust iiidic-'te inCivida.-lly, .expressly, end unecj.uivccally

tho -specific ticns cf tna'oots fcr which the cccuscd is
held respcnsihle, nc per sen aey be brcuaht tc trial ''for
taoft.''' The indictaont aust show thrt such porscn stele
\

e. certain thing under 0 r-iven set of circuadt.-noes, Neither

die' t e ^r; secuticn correct its lepse cf aoncry through
.7
It' v*,i.
\

^''''

unotuel reotific ticn :f the indictaont hefcre the

triol heg-'n, as provided in the prcoedorrl regulcticns

\\f'

;

.1

.

cf i..ilitary lribu:n.7ls, end which elcne vn uld'h.. ve j.i^de

possible o lawful tri I.
t

I

^

i evertuolesSj t..-.— dsJiaiSe siii'll briefly in its fxnoX

fe;
W''

# '
y.tit

plee cciLjont cn tho o.'..nrpes aa^de reluvant.: to, the thferetion
2frOliELIN, OS it has dene, in the ccurso cf tii; trio! end
'in its briefs. These ch; X: •es .v;ere brcu-;ht _.u::.Uoally in

court end they shcLUd. bo ..ublioelly deniod noro
I

'

-

yBv« ftL

"

'• - ,i
ai-n

•
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In locLoiient Dcoic 71 C tiie i^rosecaticn iac.s salnLitted
Iccuaent 3421, ExliiMt 2C53

•

,

v.'hich contains instructions concerning the solecticn of
Kussian l\.^3 frcn tiie IE co.iops. Such, instructions m.ye
to- do YJltii nat VI

Foreign Intelligenoo Service—

cnly inscfor ys tJiey state tii^.t this inat shall be en

titled, thrcu.:'h its cijvn'regresentatiyes, tv exoxiine ^ndcheck Pkussian

c?s to whether t h e r e a i d be soiie

o.acn.o: then --he ccald gcssiMy serve rs intelligonc'e
agents,'The defenso has grcved th t such orisoners were

recruited for the "*>pero.ticii ZiEj-'iELII-', ouj.d

y_^-lanteer§_#

Those Vvere Kussions yjIio \^ere desirous of v/cr-king for the

Gorojo.ns against'tho I'clschoviat rulers in their .no.tive
"land. The grosecution attenpted to cast

ubts upon this

volunteer status a.nd ex_:lained' that this action con

stituted a ccnpulsory drafting of prisoners-:f-war in
contrO'Vention tc

internetio'nal ia-w. The font that these

Russians carried cut intelligence cssig;.in.ents in SovietRussian, areas and net in territories occupied by the
Gernans, and, insof ..r as they -were net able to be

• -i' ^U';'.'

!St

ossi;/ned to such'jcbs either on a p.-rt or foil-tine boslSj
organized anti-lartiscn units like the •'brushino'^, fully

'Mi

•"H'i' i''

ovidsnces tho. lack :f llgio, inhe-rent in such a steteuent,
Xoes anyone serioo'Sly believe thot it was considered
possible'to utilize liussions for suoli o.ssiuiuio.uts, vhc

^d been ccniJUlscrily pr'ossod Into s6.;rvico7 ^Th,o attenpt
on the r^.rt of the prosocutich-to cloud the isso.e tnrcugh
the subseouent Introc uctiioit of the incidojrbs stirrcunding

the Ofse c.f iisroticn asl'Ljilig, wtiioh in Itsolf is inf.drUssi;--l8 6occrfln:-i tc t.liu rules cf, orlniijcl ^:-cofiuru, becoooos clear "when cno observes thtt the j-rcsccubicn, in
siite cf its own'ccntentxcn tho t these war : prisoners-

rf-w^T who had been, drafted invclit'Tt'--.rily, submitted the
r^ateriai ccverin-v Gcunt V of th.; iv. dict:..ont o ftervords,

vhereas tnese were incidents which, in thc^ VTirds of the
prosecution itself^ at best
'•.

X
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could have

felleii

under

Count I I I cf the

inc.ic'G,.^oii-t«

noW"

over, SCBELL;iI'\o.5RG yjos not even chari^ocl under Gcunt III,
ocdiseq.uently the i:rGSGcation was forced to include this
s_ecificetion, V'.fhicli vios not even xdeoitioncd in the in-

c.ictnentunder Count V, which, eccordin^ to the irrosecuticn's own steteneiro, h£:d absolutely ncthino to do
thsremth.

rroseoution docunents 47IS exhibit 2C5o end 4719 Bxhibit

2061 ccntsin c-bfeclutely ncthinn which is in line with the
(jcntenticns cf the prosecuticn. Rpther, th^rfnlly ccnfirn
the evidence subxiitted by the defense. Just cs l i t t l e does-

Doc uraent 4720 Exhibit 2061

X:rcve any criminul activity on the p.-rt cf .SCj:h4L.LDrBDI.:G.
'Xhe defense mede repeated reference to tho lGt,:8l espects

6f the security tsshs of the Einsotzisoin.'.ic.ndos. -*s s pert
I

,cf such duties reports v/ere requested concernin; the con
ditions in the unoccu.iod hussion territory by the Division

Cst of niiit VI, inscfor es such inforia.'tio.n could be obtained
throu.hi the interrcpoticii of Russian .vrisoiiors. ...nd the

concentration cajnp^, to rhich the x-i^asooution dsvcted
V

considerable attention in ti^is connection, were loyiet-

Russian camps in the i^G^ccu^ied territory,

bout tne lo

cation and inmates of v;hich informatioii wcs desired,

hcfofe \f'ie turn to further prosecution dooufoonts, e-tten*^
ticn is

called to

h*ffidavit_^y_^d,_bO'ch-Zeleyshi ( Def .Doc.3ooh I, pOjce 5)
-.affidavit Skorzeny

;7

{A'\

•

• ^2-'-i

( Def ,Dog.:.'C:.k II
3)
(Lef.Doc.hook II^ pps.48|51 and f
(tcf.I-qo.J/cc-'c Ilq,

• ' i

10)

These affidrvits cent in precise descriptions cf the
erg-nization and nodus cpiorandi of the tper'tion ZDi^EDID.
bo see hcv the Russi'On oponts were troinod, "jo letrn that
they held the sto tus of iioi.bers of the Gerncn ' oiirm..^oht,

that they received pcod traataent in every ©ose, that

• dequato. me- suros iVd be.n. taken in tho ev.urb they were

ta.ksn ill, we hear thot tho nur.iorcus Russians who could
not be assigned os a cents
*

'.'b. • •T'.hisi- '•

'i
•1

, Final Xlea SOKElLLS". i^SicG-

(pa^:e 26 df ori.^inal)
forried snti-lartis-n units under niiitery ocjxr.nd. In
tiiis case, i-*int VI —- Fpreic-n Intelligence Service -—,

v/hich had absolutely ncthiiv to^do, of ccurso, with such
cpor^'ticns, was sinply as o part cf its wcrh in assigning
agents,

tc recall the nc^cessory nen fron tlB so units for

assigruient tc Operation ZE. lELIN,

EocuiLents 4721 - 4723, Exhibit 2063^2065
illustrete the iisnner in Vvhioh neiibers cf C.-peraticn

2lE:^.-Jl,LI^v wert. assigned tc such anti-Iartisan units lihe
the Erushina.

. bith respect to the contentions of the incseoution •

in this oom^Qotion, we vi/ish to refer tc 'pa ges 61-66 of
our closing brief anc ii,ges 5 and 6 cf the reply to the

'prosecution brief, in prrtioular concerning the curious
nethcds employed by the prosecution in cucting frcm docu
ments,

•

'

be new wish tc turn tc the coc orients Yhnich were sub
mitted -with the remarh th-t &C^^ELbEi"'3EJiG hcd ''murdered

the members of Operation ZEillELIN after t^hey had served
his purposes,These are

boouments 5445 - 46, :_zhibit 2066-2068 and
LooumGnt 4724, rJxhibit i2069.
i (•'

by omitting the corresponding sections in the English
ccoument ocoh'(tho defense included the •••'^osciiilew-Loca-

mont 5446 conttinin ; the p rts emitted by tAio proseoution
in : of. bcoument book HI prgc 13ff)T the ..r oseouticn

attempted to provo tlvt the four members cf (.peraticn
hEli71.LXi^f mentioned in thoso dccucjents were obviously bmbiS
apios who h.=:d wormed thoir way into thw r~nlcs cf

cperation SEj..

bi':ic'o, as the defense lihe-vdse has

proved, nxit VI c^idd its offices had no arrest powers or
pcwors to initiate any other type of proceedinp-s, these .
porscns had been turned cvor to the Eins. tzgrup^o oonpe-

tont for Security police duties in the territory of
'Vlssckoje,
-
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v;g call a ttention tc tiis fact that the Finsatzgruppen
iiaa qaite a number of socurity tasJis of a gener. 1 nature.

If tiie Einsatzgruppen conmianclGr
had thene spies
shot vdthout trlaij then an37- responsibility for such
acti^^n pr.nnct be sttribatoc! tc fperation ZEP^IiLIn the

headqasrters of which had no coxmand authority ever the
chief of the EinsatzgrLij- .en., .e call particular attenticn
tc the proven fact that Ix.urlnTn, whose exaninotion before

Military tribunal II w:& su^aaitted in evidence, did not
speak the truth when he statod that he had nothing tc do
with the affair. The ^.csch-ilew Xccuraent shows the "iT" of
his signature at the bottom of an official dcGUiiont. Cn

pages SS-89 of the closing brief the defense describod
this point in preoiso dotarl and the court was asked to

consider the original dcou-Dionts incicatod tnerein by
persoiielly identifying then.

documents 5220-522$, .exhibit 3465-3468

were submitted by the prosecution during the cross—
examin-ticn of the def.uid-nt 3Cr-ELLE^.BhRG which pur
ported to prove that he had had three incurablj'" sick mem
bers of dpersticn ZExi.^-LIa: t kon to a concentrsticn camp.
the affidavit of Smclen, also m..nticns traaj.sfers of

Cperation Z.Ui-xELIN members tc a concentration camp. How
ever, 3. c L};1 had to admit under cross-GX-.mln.tion that'it

was never -mt VI or ( perotion lEi.. hLIN but ,the Gestapo
offices which insti ated such tronsfors. SKt LP' r.i-:;nticns
sono 200 tr-nsfers; durin.; the period frcm 1942 to 1944.
•^-.'hoii rno considers that the ^-P'.orr: ticn ZElklLIr ccnprisod
well over 15,000 men, then the utter absurdity'' of the
prosccuti-.n's unsubst.ntiotod alleaaticn, n. noly that
30;.EL'^i-i-. ..'.OitG had ha. d the -— in ether words o il —-

-
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menibers of Cperation ZEilELIN '^murdered'' after they had

ccnoleted their asei.nifge^^s, becGcies evident. C;bvi:.usly
the transfers nenticncd by
-were based on directives
17 antf,
offices, to v/idoii in its capacity as
the Goapetent Security iolici'- Office, spies and bolscbewist agents, wbo bad be^n able to wcriO tlieir way into
the ranks of >..;orcticn ZEiPTiiLIN, were turned ever. That
such incidents did cccur, with respect to the Irushina, the
c^nti-Pc-rtisan unit coHi.csed cf O^^eration ZEP-ELIN aeubers,
is shewn by

• Zaph-Zelewski (L-ef .Poo,jSodk I, page 5)
which states that after nurdering the Gernan liaison
officers a Erushina unit went over to the bolschevists,

b'e liavG neiiticned the large nucfcer cf iiea comprising
C'peraticn ZEP-SLIIC as well as the name cf oCEELlPbPEriG in
connection with the statements of the ;.rosocution. This

gives us reason tc turn again to the organizational set-up
-

,

Cf Operation ZSPl.-^LIPT as described in tlio above-mentioned

^

Affidavits 3IgHZ:_,P^, Fhr-.v* LEPEL and Pr.STEl-LIE.

These affidavits were discussed in detail by the defense
on pt-iges 97-99 of its closing brief, ^^ccofiding to this it

is R fact th£!t SC-:ELE:P^'EEPlG, in his capacity as -iu^tschef
VI| furnished the erg nizational basis for the Operation
ZEXj SLIb' in outline, form only, that, hovfovor, the leader
ship was in ehargo of the Gruppenleitor for the East - VI

C - Dr. GRiiip'Sj who directed quite indopondently the
activities of the v--.©ration ZEPxELIN vdth the assistance
cf his subord nato Peferehts.

On t--ms pcint

STEUDIE states (Dof.Dcc.book II a.pg.lO

ff):

"The Group Loader cf VI C Z, Lr. GTo.EF'., iiad as his •
Sphere cf work the Soviet Union', the Par East inol.
ciouth-Esstern . sia and the near East, ^'ith the ex
eV-.; V •,

ception of the English colibnies rxid dominions in this
area,' Most cf his work ^oncernod Soviet Russia (the

Soviet Union) and .Turkey. He strossod thu. iai-crtance of
the "Soviet Union bv;6-iuse the military" sot-b fcf.k'in the

East, v'hioh occurred towards the end of 1941, resulted
in oil military and news service cgenoies being directed
to introduce b sic changes cf operation in their sphere
of work,

Final riea, SCj:jji;LLli^ERG

(page 29 zt original)

in order to realise results, Towards tiio end of 1941
or the beginning of 1942 Operation -ijETiljLIl;' cane into

biiing, because tno vvcrlc so fc.r had net brought satis
factory results. Thus,

ertsticn fjlllnLIi

created

Parallel to the alcor'dy existing hussia DGigertnent VI
C 1 - 3», 3S1CW VI C 1 - 3 ?yoS,tG ccntinuG its previous
woric, and Operation liHiXo-ELIN, by neaus cf,G 1-orge
crganistiticn eQuip__ed with technical t'ids, V'lcis to bring
so-cellod activist groups into action behind the eneny
lines, which it either slip^xjed thrGu,;h the front or
landed behind onoLiy lines as parachutistsj furthermore,
t"';;GratiGn
*'jiiinsetzgruppcn" wore to be deployed
in the Blach See by iieans of speed boa.ts. Looking at
the organis tirnal-side, the picture was something like
tj.:is: Operation
aLLH' had a central directing head in
Jierlin, v^hich r.. s not located in the Ccntra;l Eead-

querters of

ffice VI, oerk&erstresse, but separately

in J-"otsderaerstrasse. This central directing stt.ff was
run by -a r.r-f.n'Gut, 'he ^as subcrdin: ted to &roui> •'-'eader
Lr. GK.-.LFE. 'jP-'e vital poirts of Opsraticn LL1_LLIN were
in front lino territory, in the sc-c. lied

in Intelli-

gmice Centers (i„eldohauptkciaj:.j£indGs), whichwalways were
iocVt^^d n.":-r...rmy Group ogs*. ' - • •
^

t r;
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The Kaln Intelliivorioe Gonters had so-crllod Inteliigonco
Centers with tno arnics, in the hct^innli?,.^ there were 2
in Inteliigonco Conters, one in the South, hase at
... erdjansk - one in the Forth, with boso at Fleskau. In
the course of the war F •in Inteliie;ence Centers were
established with all -..raiy Groups in-liiQ Fast, In the

lir&t yeor of its existence GRi^EFl; dolcgatod far-reaching
powers to the responsible refereniss of Cpsration ZEr..FLIF.
Towards the e.iid of 1,42 and the beginning of lv43 it was
found that the parallel activities of ~vi 0 1-3
t'percticn Zeppelin wer net conducive to success« There
upon, rr. Gro..FFi; a.orgpd ( peraticn he ,..din nd VI 0 1 - 3ant reserved for hins.-lf, as the Group -^o. dor, a deci

sive influence, burin.,' the tine I was in the office, a
ccntrcllinp influence of tht Cffice Cliiof ou''S not

__erce.,-tible, I .aevcr s.-w Herr SCiiFLL .FlShG personally
within a period of 2 years, in the offices of the re
ferent for Hussi?^,

The real interc;St of the office Chief

lay vjith the werh of the tiguiits of the forceign intelli-

•ence

service proper, end lierr;, ops in, in po-.rticular with

the foreipn intolllgence service in the ..ost»"

It would ailsc be ouite o:bsurd to assuiue tir t iSCr.J;Lj_.hFhFrtG,

s chief of til© Foroig.n Ijitelligence ^orvico v;ith his alreost

80 offices, a fact cmfirnod by witnessos, should have at
any tiiiie been in oi ._Gsition to direct an crg':ni2:.oticn
oon,,osGd of 15,000 Russians and to trouble hinself with

t..o dot.-ils of th-ir w:rk. Fc.cuin.nt 471>, '-•x.hibit

2061

illustrates, for ^.xo'nni^^, how ho concerned hinself with
salient inttors such
oo^ents as a

s prcv(;nting tbvj

r^cliuting of

result . f tho r^jfusal of the nuftwaff.

plccv. scno fi-nes

t

to

his cispcsole

,J.\.ppA'if;!

•W!"'

'• • •
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izClFLLT .'IFKG kii-=-,' ncoiii'iix- of individual eA;0nts,

ir

their assignments end their personal conduct, and just•'B

little

'.bcut

t 'G

innujjiereble

ind;..viduol

neosures

VJhioh hod to
token every day in the UZ (»^. orttion
Zep^.-elln) by G-rcui vT c and its Referents.
In the course of the defense^s c: se up to new cur

citing cf &11 prcsecuticn documents -once - gcin has not

been pointless. TJ-cn excninr tion tney sh:w th- t not_a^
sin:;le one of tneso dccui^'-ents mentions the n^-ne-of
&C.-:.}i;LLb.vhERG in ccimocticn with the order for sny criminal

ect of eny sort. R^vinore is r

statement ^lade to the effect

that SCrJ.LLRI\:.iihC- ordered anything illegal or- tht^t he
even became ev'^re of any illego.l ecticn on the ;-brt of

offices or persons .subcrdin'tite to hii_. ^fhe prcsecuticn,

thus, has not only not been able to prove th't SCHELLEl^:b.jRG gave the order oven in ah^cna-^ae-'to touch e hair of

any person's heod. uhe; also were unobiiB to submit any
documents proving - ny Icncwledge or even

rovd on the

port .of mChELd.;.::i;::G of illegal octicns by ills subordina
tes, Thus this excludes eny possibility :i holding him .

criminally responsible for incidents cf which he eannpt
even be oroved to imvo ix d knci'Vledge. , The uofense in its

Clcsinr brief pointed out the limits for the possibility
of holding the so.....orior the responsible'for txie octlons
of subcrdin-tes, -uch responsibility con only exist for
actions of e su jdi'dinate which fall Y'lrhin tne duties
trensferr<.d to to.e l--ttsr end which were ordered by the

superior in genorol or in detail, but in tiie most extreme
C::se ct leeet come to nis attention and ore ct least

tacitly ap.^-roved oy him., pCiitiiLhh. of; G did not cj..jrOt^t the
j.i0f-d of Group Vi

G:-i.hbb, who heeded operation

Zep..elln (-UZ) with his subordinate. ...--ferent.

-
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TJie -laer.ds cf ^^oaps v/ert- net ep.^ointed bjr tiis .iroschefs,
•jLit ty the Chief cf the
i>r. GRkIP .
G-ruppenL iter clreecy under G-hifLL'-i ELKG's predecsssar

jchT

there, was nc occ.--£icn tc cuesticn his wcrh which coraplied
with ree-ul^-ticns B It is chvious that the
SCIJilLL M-J.ruG was necess.-.rily lieiited to the overall office
polides cwinc tc the entont cf the iwork in c soci^et intellifeiLoe service, . nd uncer wf. rtine conditions. P"g

Gv^neral was held r0S..onsihle for eny acts of his crorps
if it was not clearly ..roved that he hiiisolf {xys orders
for action or received th ..n and rt^l&yed then, or that
h- a ctualiy na d kn " lee.ye ci t ctions . i his

w^r

rv^y-rded .-s illcy-1, no otner

jroup wjhich

stnodard c .n he apj^Aied

in t.ue c. se cf to.e defo..d'.ht bCi._LLLE..."hh ,G, .. nc' in this

0 s^, ther-. is not ov.-n one occuraent which v;culd ;,.ermit
a. 0 conclLisicn tn t

one cf hos subordinctes could oven

holiove th-. t ne would . .oet with the es3:'eoiao..rb of his

... .tsc.'ief in orderinj or ..eri..:ittin^' an illeyl cction,
if the letter lec"'.m'..d cj. ft. Ih this connection

life to point out cnco x-cr'.. th/t in the.

would

.issckoje cases

<-s v?ell OS in the o s.;s ..-o.:..tioned by i^^ixlen t.here is no

...vidonce of sots by ..oxi.ors cf Gruppe VI 0 or one of its
cflices, but en action hy offices over which ...I'lt VI and

its offices h^ d nc cut.ncrity to issue orders, p nly in the
c Cos of the 3 incur '.•*1-:

p- tients, Uh nunhors, do local

or y-nizc" tions of tne Uh cp..-s^r. .i^-nd a

p.. .pos cf these

the

-.ffidr.vit Lr, &'fj5Uh)Iii ( • efense Log.hock Ifo, ps^o lO)
St .tos i

-
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*

cna of t-n^ c ctivis'bs bacaLie sicii:, he WcS trscted
ei-G.aar in the sicL

cf-.tJie caiip cr transierr..cl to a

"
Gilt iicspitel, Lu.rin- : ny two yec.rs rctivity in VI
C'l 1-3, I never knev of o single Cc.se cf siclc ootivists

novin.g'been killed, -fs rc-gcrds tiie docoi-^ants sLc-. n to ne
hy t ne L e f e ns e;

,• C-Cui_ej.it nG 5220 j

i.ij.nieit _ c • 34-65,

locLLr-ieiit i\'Gr 5221, ..cchik-it rG^3466,
i-ccujr.ent LG 5222^ "ixliiiit ro. 3467 and

•".ocarcieiit

LG 5223, -•xnllit i'c. 346S

vchicli der-1 vith. tvjo . ctivists suffering froiu c pulruonfry

disease, I c n st-.v.-e tn^, uccording to ni^'- kncv/lodge of

t.dvj" v-/?y tde V'crk of tJ.o Cffioe CMef, tile Grcui:- Le- ders
e nd t.he PoferentSj

£ c istributed, tne

suroLi d id_nc t_p3r£on__ili_crder_such_tilings
'I

IrG-dy o-xploined, •/'orj

nyiic\-j outside tno fi.-ld covered

jv.v or-"ticn nep;:ilin (dt)
'G

o..-;..

;aly the iiost ess ...ntirl port of the; int^lii^gnce^results
cf'
oroticn Zeppelin recched the Office Chief
i'Thus bC..--.LLd ;-.jxjPG-hi.. .£--lf
nothing
tsoover^ of
t-o-ese incidents. . ct... t.o.-.. turning over of U-j p^.rticipants,
ocho hod berjn unj:i'S-c.-d

s sj.ic.s to tnc; conpet-.-n^ „olicc

cfiioeSj c.nd the le £t-iie.aticned excesses of On 01 goniztjtions

br "vvhioh the bZ p rtici;.- .•..•ts "vjere put into t..io Concentro-

ticn C:'iip therefore tcc.k ^'1 ce without the j.-oscji-.ility of
hj.B i..itt;rfc^riii-' h-.;fcr

.10 cr taking steps cfcerwords

'o.p iiist the guilty i-ti-;£. For these l-u.-it b.lo events,
t.-.:.ero,icr e, the def ndcnt liCdlLLh.. ^j-PG c n clciia no res..:onsibillty, He could not even b-v sentunood for tncii if
he -Gtu lly h.;d beni pL cod under indict.ir:int for incidents
".""hio.b. coGurred'in tn^ tp-r tion Zeppelin, icnich, uowdver,
is net cll th-: C'-se. h'r t.'..-.e other cn;rgos oroii :.at under
count "V of tile Indictment geinst the defendmt i-CALLfLbl..-

•

iJjPG, however, the rosicution hu s also f. Hoc. to. prove that
with. i:. oo^lit tion and kncwinvly, con .itted f.n .
ot Hich w. s cri.nil 1. hnoroforc wo roi:uost

. "oh count V.

-
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S.zY' "fciiere rG_'.riiis "biia cli-rge cf ii-iifoorslii

iii £n or-

o.^rii2.^tiGii dool-TGO- cri.^:.i:i 1, since SCI-:iLL..;:. i."-:!;'.G wgs o
n,

oer

cf tiio

;'S

c

.ntschef VI

:

z-± the ^1)

offer 1 ^eptoiii'rer lv3v. ---.o wes net Indictod fcr neiibership
in ...} it IV (-.3 Grun..c nl ei t
IV L. - count or vjS\icnc"-eo - from
one -and. of 1939 tc tn..j uiddlt; cf 1941* In fliis comiocticn

11 thc> ccnclusions -jiaioii tiie prosecution drov/ frcxii the

cl i_i th't £01.911 • I'P.G.vrs deputy cf .iitschof IV, LJJLLIihli,
ore eliiiiiin. ted 3 ~ clciraj vhich by the vvy, in ny cose hes
n^.on refuted to tho. full-^st extent.

In our Closi;.:..;^ Iri^f, pe^e 170-172, "e doi'icjistr^'ted in
t.et:il til t punishr.i...nt for the sc-c lied -"ci"p'-nnizc tiono,l
criivi3'^ cciinot bo b sod s:lely on the f-ct of .loiiberahipe

It .,,resun,..s "kncvlof -e^- rnd this "kn wledpe- Oo.ust include
t...o f

ct thet th.j dofencoiii. V/os nv^are thc.t his Lieiibership

furtn red the n'tori, liz.--tion of criciinel on.ds. It follovjs

frcn this th. t

no cn - c n be punishod -:,s c" ^.ionber of e

ori^,lin^l crp'. niz-ticn r?hc on the ccntrery op osed the
ooni...ittino cf crii...s .no .erscn^lly did net cormit ony^

Ihe :;-rosecuticn ondo vorod to paint tno defendant os

V-' rc 'ue vjith :.-.;Gn3r' liz ticns beciusee tno^r yjoi-g incrcosingly
u:isuccessful in subriittin-v t. dccuiient cr cny other evidence
"..'hich ^'iculd link the noiio oi belter oC^.bvLL.j.' IIG vdth any

orininol ^ cts.

-•"^"idence

ut t.oo defense hi s subnitted

vervLhelnin^:;

in which iiont 1 pynnestics do not h: vo to be applloo.

in order to ^.roduoc tn-: closest connection cf the nfrue and
the _:.srsGn of oC .bLL ! , 'bbCr to events and inciCGnts to vhich

tnousends cf nen :-''e the- .preserv tlcn of their nealth and
liv...s, be would li':o to st- te in f.dv. ncs th't txie ^.rosecution

Pi-

•s

I'U.tter of ccurso mde-ivorecl with every xx-.ms i t its

corn end

to
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Final i-lec SCIllLiLi'BEEGI-

(p^^ge 35 of ori^^nal)

belittle • Iter d0.c...

:/l-i-ivG, by trying to iiini-dse £io-

bivds fcr inconuost-ble c ctions on his ;:v i-t, 'two ^r^aps
't such fictivt;S v:oro -iloged: first,
.^jHG used his

d deeds like o ...etty -erchent, l-.b r.ere -jj.cts :.f
eG^n..mic tnd p.'litic.:! trading; he v;es n t n-.tivdted by
cne inner urge- t: d-.j: d, but he only wanted n terlal edvoii-i.-gos fcr 'Ge
ny, ,:arh:. ps ncney rr delivorios cf

go^ds ivhioh Grerraeny needed, ^-.nd seccndly, aC.t.iih,! BEKG

lent e helping hand tc the persecuted, prisoners and per
sons whose lives v/oro in danger only v.'hen it v^os guite
rbvirus th- t Gern-hy vruld lose the wsr. „.id ct this
tiiiG, he wonted t- ere te the pcssibility fcr hinself
<• nd ...•In LLH tc oe s,. ved frcrithe sinicing snip v/ith tiie
f<.'ll k-f the Third ..->ich ond its leaders by or*"!'ting
end carrying "^ut nu.vnitorisn neesures,

Oie thi. g is Lxc.odiocGely striking vnth regard to these
•^llegeticns: tj.iey ccnn:t deny th.-t the acts, t.hct is the

deeds, t...e Imp-rtn.oo 'f which the prcsecutirn is trying
t: ninimize were perf-rnod, 'Vhcwever protects frcn death
0 person v^hcse life is in denser is ct cny rcte the ssvicr in
•ti.C6 k.f need, even if .ho did count on being reworded fcr
his action. ..e h ve, ii.:" evor, called attention in the
cl-,sing brief cf t..".iO defejise tc the foot that bCl-nLLL' BEHG
by nc rieans thought of bjing rewarded fcr his aid, j.nd
•further, that xie did. net rexaenber the persons v/hc so ught

his help only when the cclloipse beome en cbvicus danger
for everyone. In order tc see these truisiis, \io raust first

-f all turn to still on'ther subject: c>0:.:jLh.,. . bhG^s ettenpt
t. end t 6 V7er by

nego ti. teddpeace with tho

estern

pcv;ers, end finally also, by

-
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(page 36 cf criginal)

accepting at the right tine the unconditicnal SLirrender,
and his effrrts tc carr3^ cut a chang-e in Gernony^s
regimG. In its cldsing briof, the prcsecuticn criipletely

igncred those pirns cf &CHJi;LLBNBf.Ea. .gere thoy cculd
n-t find any rewards and lactives cf ccnpensatirn fcr

ohcir^purp-sas r dctracti:n, rt least ncne besides the

g'. .d .:f the ccuntry and the p^cple tc whcra SCIP-LIP-KBERa

bv.l.,n^s, ivnd a defendant v/h:. cbvicusly wcriccd f:r the
a^nv^fit
his c un'ory naturally dees net ap gaf as a

o<..d i_.un, which 3Ci:PIiLLnn7j;iPG. is suppcsod tc bo, us "a
ousyb^dy ^nd an cppc-rtuiiist, with t. finger in cvory pie
whv. L^.thcs in the r-flGCticn ;f Self-adninistraticn'", as
tno iJr^seoutic.n in its clr.slng brief beliovoS:it can
sc elegantly on raotorizo belter SCI-lE'LLFiCPEPG, If one

doiiicnds frcn the dofcndant &CKELLb:""BERG that ho cp.^cse
tnu upparuti-.ns -f the rogiiuo. ,.t a fi-vci-cable juncture
ho Gcaia nrt bettor hove cciiipliGd with this dcnand than
bo uctueliy did, J..C ycu noun xjorhaps tc insiat thot he orty and SS ncnbor frcn 1933, us such suspected and

a

troc-tod as an onony by the oanurilla cf the ='cld fighters"
f-i_ .tic Pati..ni"l 3cciriists in the
—should have
^un .-S u sub-, rdiiiuto ...cgiGrun-'Srut and ubcrrc'gErungs-

r^t^t.. dofoat the systen? P't until ho liud attained tc u
ceru in pcsiti.,-n die h . gain an insight at all intc the

binoti, ns ^f tbc rogircv. .nd fcllrwing this, then, the
i---ssi-;ility rf wricing rg-inst ft teful develcpnonts. At

thG^ ..ginnin.' -f

1^41, SCH.LL7b-.J.i;G tc.'lc ever ^nt '

f-roi,,n intollig^naco service - 'f tlio RSI-I... He had

Toc.ohud the g ,'l vrhich hnc". enticed tho ycun. • nan fcr
3ears . B his iif^ wric: he o" uld begin t: build up a .
r.i.n oocret FcrGi,;n Intelligonco Service, p.r eyery
untry the existence :f such an • rganiz-ticn is the
proroquisita far a succossful

-
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(po.g:c 37

--riGinal)

irreifiii pclicy, caid tiioso - ctivities arc a ccniDletely
legal onl hcncrablo sorvico f:r tiae fttlicrland. In Na-

ti nal Scciollst- Geiyi.. ny tlic orindidatc f r faroign intolligenoe service iircl t

prroecd vlt. m^iibcrsM'; in tiie

S3 and tJie i^SEj-. in ;rclor tc be able t: - Tic in tills field,

lT:w, in tbe aidst -f tho v;ar, SCHILLLnfv.EHG^s tesl: was
drably difficult. Thus, o ccrt; in length -f tiao hrd tc

p-rss bofcrc ho ivd gained the nest basic loiriviodg-.^ cf
crnditirns, ^.nd yet, ovon frrn this first pori'd -f in-

dogendnnt cotivity :f the defendant, v/c have the evidence
tlvt things wore chnigin-;. Ihus, i-r. HulSGSL states in his

. affidavit {lof, "Ccc. Peek I, p£.ge 36);
=*Tho now tendencies in the actual intolll.genoo service
under &CIILLLb;."BPHG very sc'.n beccnc n::ticot:blQ

tc no casr in

fi^^ld 'f wrk - Switzorlcnid. .Switzer

land, just like tho cthor neutral ccuntries was ;f

interest t: hin in tho first piece . s a base serving
f:r the estoblishncnt and neintenr.ncc :f crntacts

with the hestern prwors through tho intelligence

sorvico. In tMs c'lmootian I nyself had already
nado the ex},Grienoo in 1942, thf t ho attached the

troetest inpcrtrnco tc these r&loti-ns, which rffered
tho possibility cf a '^politic'. 1 exclr nge, rf idoss"
with the Vostc.vn pcv/ors. The first cose rf this kind..."

'iith E.YPniCEPs death and the direct loddorsliip rf the FtSHl

by HIil'XER in luno 1942, oano bCHELLE-bSRCT*s first cppcrtunity. He had hod tho chance .f devclcyin: and crnfirning .
rec" niticn

f tho fact tnot Gt.rnon^s i.vny led tc ruin end

n^w ho did net hesitate tc act in accTdranoo v/ith this
rooconitiv''n.

-
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When in the Pummer of 1942 he was called in to report to Hitiniler he

presented his opinion about the situation and about the steps becoming

necessary as a result. He urged Himmler to exert his influence in favor of
a termination of the war, calling Ribbentrop's policy ah.obstacle to an
understanding with the West and begging Himmler to eliminate Ribbentrop,
iilso for these events 'we have evidence in the form of an affidavit by

Rademacher (Defense Doc.Bk»II» P»105)* Of what political tide did Schellen-

berg at that moment take advantage? Ifetional-Socialism then believed itself
to be at the crest of its power and successes. There was no assurance as to
how Himler would receive ?chelleuberg»s ideas. -*^erhaps only the prosecution
would like to make believe that the 32-year old Qberregierungsrat wanted

to become Reich Foreign Ivlinister and replace Ribbentrop? The possibility
that Himmler would let this daring young men disappear into oblivion was
much nearer. Yet a miracle occurred: He listened to ?chellenbergi yes to a
certain degree he even got interested inidais opinion. Here begins the
struggle which Schellenberg led for years toward mobilizing Himmler as

a political figune in the great game for the welfare of the Reich. One of

those to describe what happened is Trevor-Roper who gave an analysis in his
book "The last days of Hitler". Hov/ naive, he says, of Pchellenberg to

believe that it was possible to bring about a change in Germany through

Himmler, Hov/ indicative, says the prosecution, one criminal working hand in

hand with another, perhaps Trevor-Roper in the meantime has sonewhat modified
his 1945 conception of history, vihat possibilities did Schellenberg envisage
for putting his ideas into effect? Even the men of the so-called resistance
movement placed their
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bets on tke horse Himmler when they realized that neither the »'fehriracht

nor any other group with power was in a position or even made any serious
efforts to actively combat Hitler's policy of n^dness. Y/e know this from

Allen W. Dulles book "Germany's Underground". Can Schellenberg be blanied
for tackling the bull by the horns ? Y/e might pay oiir respect to his
course instead. It v/as clear that everyhting he presented

fought for

thereafter was directed against Hitler j Hitler had stated that he ^.vould

never capitulatei but would end this war only as absolute victor# Whoever

was insisting upon peace, peace at the price of Hitler's successes,
obviously was against Hitler. If only Himnler for once would have used the

power which no doubt he held in Germany and reverse the course, the

avalanche would have been set in motion. This - aaod we may state so without

hesitation - would have benefited everybody, and prinnrily Geriieny of which
Pchellenberg naturally was thinking before anything else, tTennany would have •
been spared immeasurable misiortune, and not only Germany but all of

humanity. For it is obvious that a revolution in Germany and the conclusion.
of a peace treaty would have brought about a turn for tiie better also for all

others including the persecutees of the former regime. Ro much for this, if'e

know, that Himmler was not the man to act eourageouslyj Schellenberg himself
has said that he was too cowardly to reach this momentous decision. This

realization,however, came too late. Continually Hiirmi .t gave encouragement,
'-'chellenberg continued making new contacts with the </est, ,/e do not want to

go into details at this point, a surarmry can be found on pages 122-129 of the

Final Hrief of the defense. We quote only as an exaii5)le Hubert von Breisky's
statement

:r

FIN^ PLEii Sc^XiiiN'BiiHJ

concerning his talks v;ith ^chellenberg which took place in I942. contained
in Ms affidavit (Def .Doc.Bk.I, p.24/25) and contained in our
Brief
on page 124» and as a climax the negotiations v/hich ^chellenberg per^^onaliy
conducted vjith the American "Hevdtt in Stockholm.

In a .statement which was introduced by the defense on behalf of the

defendant fchellenberg the Comniander-in-Chief of the Svdss ^rmy during the
war» General Guisan, and the Chief of the Swiss military ihteliigejj^,^^
Colonel-Brigadier kHsson, confirm that it was Schellenberg v;ho repeatedly
intervened when it was intended to spread the war further by a German
I

invasion into Switzerland, and who thereby saved tiiat country f^om the '
horrors of war.

Even during the last few days of the war it was again •'^chellenberg
who countered the imminent danger inherent in Kilter's order to the strong
f:S and wehrmacht urats st;inding intact in Denmark and Narv/ay and which
were to

until all installations and resourc^is of those countries

were destroyed. By -his action he preserved these countries from the fate
of the "scorched earth" policy.

Thus from 1942 on ?chellenberg did everything ivithin his power to
bring about peace and a change of the regime in Germany^ Although Himmler
did not offer unconditional surrender until the last fev/ days of the war,
and then was deposed as a traitor by Hitler from his position as

"Reichsfuehrer-SF" and expelled from the party* one cannot charge
S'chellenberg vvith 11th hour panic because he worked since 1942 toward
obtaining action v/hich if it had come in tirae would h ve been the first

step to a better future 1 a better future for Germany and the world, not fcr

Himmler, that was quite clear to Schellenberg, The witness ivioeller confirmed
that he nade it quite clear to PchelleidsBsrg that, Himmler would not b©

acceptable, xie might h3ve been tolerated to play a temporary role during

the short transitory period while a complete change f/as taking place; that

in effect was Schellanhtrg's conception of the historic possibilities, and
- 40 -
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others who are aloof of any suspicion of Mation,al Socialist ideologies
shared ttose views.-Mr. Trevor-Roper is, of course, wiser, yet

he forgets to tell us what a Germn in Pohellenberg-s circumstances ought
to have done to bring about a change. It- would have even been impossible
for him to resign since during this period a Chief of the intelligence
service could not take such action without.jeopardizing his career at the
same time and with no advantage to anybody. ..s a result

- 40 a -
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a National Socialist fanatic very likely v;ould have taken over his

positieru

Foreigners and G-eriaans, v/ho, an their dire distress were looking to

someone for help, would have called such a man untrustworthy and disinclined
to mediate and grant help* Our reference to Schell^nberg's efforts since
19^1.2 tov;ard peace and a claange of conditions in Germany enables us now
to fully appreciate Schellenberg's acts of assistance. The mm who anti

cipated Germany's disaster also realized what was one of its causesj
The inhuman attitude of the regime toward those v/hom it considered its
enemies. Nobody knew better than Fchellenberg that the following day he

might share their fate. His atteirpts to make Himmler a tool of his ov;n
political intentions revealed to him this m-on's mentality* He kms® toat

arguments he hid to use to even get him interested in a matter. No witness

has claimed that it was Schellenberg who demanded that any assistance expended

be reciprocated, ^inybody mking such a claim simply distorts the witness

statement. The witness IVIoeller clearly parried such a prosecution atter^jt
with the following statement: "I think the suggestion from ?^chellenberg
was made in order to give Himmler an inducement to assist with the various

actions that hive been suggested" (Transcr.p,8873)« Lloeller knew Schellenberg

thoroughly, again and again he turned to him for help for persons threatened
by the regime, and he always discussed with him all possibilities to arrive
at a successfull result through Himmler, it began in 19^2 with j/peller's
negotiations concerning the 7 "Vjarsav/ Swedes". Thanks to Schellenberg the
4 Swedes condemned to death
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eventually v/ere released as were those who had been sentenced to prison
terirs* It is absurd to believe that Hiiaraler could be v;on over sinply by a

clemency request for persons whoi no doubt rit^htfullyi had been convicted
fcr espionage against Gemnny and that during v/artine. Somehow he had to
be convinced that by such a gesture at least Germny would be able to

improve its diplomtic relations with .Sv/eden. The witness lioeller described
how Pchellenberg even drafted letters for the Swedes which they were to send
to HimalB r in order to ir,^art to them specific argimisnts which he knev/

would induce positive action on the part of Himader. The same witness tells
us that in fact no service was rendered in return* V?e hear that a letter

vn^itten by the Swedish King to Hitler in this mtter remined altogether

unanswered and that the Foreign Office granted no help. It thus is apparent
that this affair was not such a simple "busi.ness" and that it was merely

necessary to show the Germans a potential advantage in order to get the
Swedes released^ No, in this instance a really humane action took place,

and Schellenberg vra.s the good Samaritan.

Once his humane readiness to help had become known people again and

again looked to him for help. ThUvS his assistance was solicited in
obtaining a release for the Norvegian students and L^nish policemen
v/ho had been arrested and deported to Germany., ^Iso in this instance

Schellenberg rendered assistance^ They v/ere returned to their native
country.

Again his help was sought in order to obtain the release of the
Horvegian shipowners Clavenes and Bjoern-Hansen, They were set free.
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The Danish professor M'^gens Fog had been arrested. When Schellenberg
intervened on his behalf he was released.

The S^Tedish legation secretary Raoul Wallenberg in Budapest had

fallen into disfavor vdth the men in powerj in this case the inpendlag
measures were averted..

Schellenberg successfully intervened to alleviate the lot of allied

prisoners of war; due to his efforts, the family of French General Giraud
was freed. General Giraud too knows that a malocious wran could have said

in contemptous indifferences A gestice to mike at the last minute an
impression on the prospective victor. Yet ^eneral Giraud saysj

noble

himianitarian act. He knows that there were enough rascals who were
coEDpletely unconcerned about making an iitpression on the victor.
The final brief of the defense on pages lJO-132 lists this and ,
numerous other instances of help

rendered by Schellenherg, The prosecution

did not bother to tell us which advantages were for instance granted as
Tenuneratdon" for all these individual acts of humanitarianism,- But we

realizes Schellenberg had to vvrest these concession from

they were granted ualy jecause ^chellenbiASg during all these years
continuously admonished Himmler to be less radical and because he kept
pointing out to him that only a discontinuation of the barbarities of the

regime were the indispensable prerquisite for potential negotiations with

the Western powers, a motive J Yes, and an absolutely honorable one.
Would the prosecution prefer a Fchellenberg who like the fanatic proponents
of-a victory "without compromise" in Hitler's and also Hiiianler's entourage
vTOUld have denied his help for persecuted persons and people in distress ?
Would the prosecution have preferred not to have
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a Schellenberg who paved the way for tie Swiss Federal President

Musy

in his negotiations with Hiimiler t
If Schellenberg

did not succeed until toward the end of 1944

persuading Hinunler to take action which changed the fate of mny thousands

of peoplei this again is not ®chellenberg»s fault, it is rather the fruits of
his efforts which he continued for years# 'without these "the successes are
unfeasible*

What was Dr. Musy's success ? 1200- lews were brought, to ?vdtzerland
fromTheresienstadt# Numerous individual Jewish families were released from

•eoncentration camps,

a concession was wrested from Hinualer to the effect

that concentration camps were no longer to be ©vacuated upom the approach of
allied troops. In the course of these evacuations unnumerable persons had

lost their lives on account of the haidships to which they were exposed* ,and
finally >the assuranae was given that no further harm would be done to the
Jews who remained in the concentration can5>s»

This action saved the lives of thousands of persons. ,o.nd this snould
mean nothing because these events occurred during the list few months
of the war ^ ne hive already asked in our Fiml Brief and wo aks here
before the world* "Did the life of a Jew have less value at the end of

1944

the beginning of 1945 than at any other time? Does the person

who rendered assistance at that juncture deserve any less gratitude

tinn at any other tine ^ The defense has a corapreliensive nenorandun by the
Swiss Rabbi Dr. Sternbuch \/ritten for the ^mierican Rabbits committee

about the I\2usy-action which was carried out following the efforts by these

organizations, Numerous nesv^apers abroad stressed Dr. Musy'a merits. «nd
Pchellenberg v What does Dr. Muay say about the role played by him ? He saysi
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"I consider i t out of question that the release of the persons

Ji

as it was carried out would have been pos^^ible without the

cooperation of 'jeneral Schellenberg",

(Def•Doc.Book IIip.92)«
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As a last point j The relief operation of Count Bernadotte- In the
beginning of 1945» Count Bernadotte, oarie to Germany in order to isve

as large a nimber as possible of primarily Jewish concentration caii^)
inmates by their transfer, to Sweden# To whtm was he referred in order to

obtain Hinmiler's

approval for his plan 'i T#'the defendant Schellenberg 1

^ind what was the result ^ vVe quote here the affidavit which this great

man, whc r'.n the meantime has died in the struggle for peace and humanity,

irade on behalf of the defendant Schellenberg (Defense Doc.Bk. II, p,3 ff)i
"Through the action of the Swedish Red Cross about 2o,000 prisoners
were transferred to Sweden; the prisoners who were Danes remained
in Denmark# Thereby it was prevented that a great nuraber of them

died in the concentration cau^)©"#

As to the role which Schellenberg played Count Bernadotte states
the follovdngj
"Schellenberg assisted me indefatigably and to the best of his
ability and I dare say with certainty that hhe whole project could

not have come to pass without ^chellenberg's so positive and vatuable
assistance and that i t would not have turned out successfully either#."

'Ihe question nov; arises whether it was easy for Schellenberg to support
this action in 1945» The contrary is the case, ii last wave
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of the nost ferocious intent to destroy enveloped Germany^ A tenacious
struggle againpt the obstruction of such people as K^ltenbrunner and

^Aieller, the xnastera of the concentration camps, had to be conducted*.
It coiad have ended any minute with the liquidation of Schellenberg and
his aids if these men would have asked Hitler for such an order*.
Yet what does the prosecution say about this last gamble .of

Schellonberg's ?. Let as quotet
"He gambled and lost",

^ the translation presented to the defense this ptirase took on the
following v/ordingj

"ET hats mal versucht, aber vergebens K" (He gambled and lost)..

Vie however say: "He gambled and won". He gambled with his own life and
the life of others.

last and good gamble!

And he won - the life of the

others*.

Vvhat is resistance ? Resistance is something that actually

opposes and iiiqjedes the action L.f a force, Something that - in order to

speak in the terms of physics - shows an actual result v/hich can be recognized
and measured. Resistance inplies deeds not words i where are there more deeds#
KoTe successfiil deeds# deeds# the evident result of which is the saving

of the. lives of innumerable per.-^ons, than in the case of the defendant
Schellenberg

This man Schellenberg was not av/are that he v/as serving

criminal ends while being a member of an organization which was held criminal.

He used his membership to fight for a new regime in Germany, for peace and

for the lives of many thousrands of people, "we aks that he also be acquitted on
count VIII of the indictnBnt.
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